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Active	Bacterial	Core	surveillance	(ABCs)	was	established	
in	 1995	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Centers	 for	 Disease	 Control	 and	
Prevention	Emerging	 Infections	Program	(EIP)	network	 to	
assess	the	extent	of	 invasive	bacterial	 infections	of	public	
health	 importance.	ABCs	is	distinctive	among	surveillance	
systems	because	of	its	large,	population-based,	geographi-
cally	diverse	catchment	area;	active	laboratory-based	iden-
tification	of	cases	to	ensure	complete	case	capture;	detailed	
collection	of	epidemiologic	 information	paired	with	 labora-
tory	 isolates;	 infrastructure	 that	 allows	 for	 more	 in-depth	
investigations;	and	sustained	commitment	of	public	health,	
academic,	 and	 clinical	 partners	 to	 maintain	 the	 system.	
ABCs	has	directly	affected	public	health	policies	and	prac-
tices	through	the	development	and	evaluation	of	vaccines	
and	 other	 prevention	 strategies,	 the	monitoring	 of	 antimi-
crobial	drug	resistance,	and	the	response	to	public	health	
emergencies	and	other	emerging	infections.
Active Bacterial Core surveillance (ABCs), a program in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) Emerging Infections Program (EIP) network, was 
launched in 1995 as part of the CDC strategy to address 
the worldwide threat of emerging infectious diseases (1). 
The goals of EIP are to detect and investigate emerging 
pathogens; integrate laboratory science and epidemiology; 
enhance communication about emerging diseases; and 
strengthen the state and federal public health infrastruc-
ture with regard to surveillance, prevention and control 
programs. Before establishment of EIP, little was known 
about the national burden of many of the disease areas now 
under its surveillance umbrella, which include foodborne 
diseases, influenza-related hospitalizations, health care–as-
sociated infections, and invasive bacterial infections.
ABCs and other EIP activities are collaborations be-
tween CDC, state and local health departments, and aca-
demic institutions. Originally established at 4 sites (Cali-
fornia, Connecticut, Oregon, and Minnesota), by 2003 
ABCs added Georgia, Maryland, New York, Tennessee, 
Colorado, and New Mexico, for a total of 10 sites. The sites 
represent geographic diversity and approximate the racial 
composition of the US population (2). Currently, the popu-
lation under surveillance ranges from 19 to 42 million (up 
to 12% of the US population), depending on the pathogen.
ABCs provides population-based surveillance for 
select causes of invasive bacterial infections in the com-
munity, primarily manifested as bloodstream infections 
and meningitis. At its inception and continuing today, it 
includes surveillance for invasive infections caused by 
group A Streptococcus (GAS), Haemophilus influenzae, 
Neisseria meningitidis, group B Streptococcus (GBS), 
and Streptococcus pneumoniae. Surveillance for invasive 
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), 
which had long been recognized as a significant nosocomi-
al pathogen, was added to surveillance in 2004 because it 
had emerged as a substantial cause of invasive infections in 
the community (3). In 2001, rising rates of pertussis (http://
www.cdc.gov/pertussis/surv-reporting.html) and legionel-
losis (4) led to the addition of special surveillance for these 
diseases to ABCs.
Invasive pneumococcal disease (IPD) provides an 
example of the power of this large, sustained, population-
based surveillance system for evaluating public health in-
terventions and providing feedback for additional preven-
tion measures. Although S. pneumoniae is a major cause 
of invasive infections (e.g., bloodstream infections and 
meningitis) in the United States and worldwide, IPD is not 
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reportable in all states. In the late 1990s, when a new vac-
cine was being developed, a system was needed to deter-
mine baseline rates of IPD, evaluate vaccine effectiveness, 
and monitor circulating serotypes. After establishment of 
ABCs to fill the void of tracking the disease burden of 
IPD and other major causes of invasive bacterial disease 
in the United States, ABCs detected a large reduction in 
IPD detected among children <5 years of age (for whom 
vaccination with 7-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine 
[PCV7] was recommended in 2000) and among adults, 
who benefited from herd protection. ABCs also recognized 
an increase in IPD rates caused by S. pneumoniae serotypes 
absent from PCV7; this information resulted in accelerated 
approval of a 13-valent pneumococcal vaccine (PCV13) 
that has resulted in further reductions in IPD.
Not all infections captured under ABCs are reportable 
to CDC. Even for those infections included in the CDC Na-
tional Notifiable Disease Surveillance System, case counts 
may be underestimated because they rely on reporting by 
laboratories and clinicians, whereas ABCs tries to actively 
identify 100% of the cases within the surveillance area. Ad-
ditionally, epidemiologic data collected by health depart-
ments are often incomplete because of limited resources 
and the inflexibility of the system to capture variables of in-
terest. Unlike the National Notifiable Disease Surveillance 
System, ABCs also collects isolates and serotypes and tests 
them for antimicrobial drug susceptibility. These attributes 
enable ABCs to fulfill 2 critical objectives: 1) to determine 
the incidence and epidemiologic characteristics of invasive 
diseases under surveillance and 2) to determine molecular 
epidemiologic patterns and microbiological characteristics 
of these invasive infections.
ABCs Methods
For routine surveillance, a case of invasive bacterial dis-
ease is defined as isolation of H. influenzae, N. meningiti-
dis, GAS, GBS, S. pneumoniae, or MRSA from a normally 
sterile body site (e.g., blood, joint, pleural, or cerebrospinal 
fluid) in a resident of the surveillance area. Additionally, 
cases include ill persons from whom GAS is isolated from 
a wound or other tissue in the presence of necrotizing fas-
ciitis or streptococcal toxic shock syndrome. Cases of GBS 
in a mother are also included if GBS has been isolated from 
the placenta or amniotic fluid in the event of fetal death.
The ABCs approach to surveillance is distinctive; it 
is active, laboratory based, and population based. The 
goal is to detect 100% of laboratory-confirmed cases by 
actively contacting all clinical laboratories that routinely 
process specimens from residents of the surveillance area. 
Audits are performed regularly to ensure case capture. Ef-
forts at most sites to make ABCs pathogens reportable to 
state public health agencies have facilitated participation 
of almost all laboratories (≈600) that serve the surveillance 
population. Because the population under surveillance is 
well-defined, US Census data are used to calculate disease 
incidence rates within the ABCs population. Because of the 
large population base, CDC uses ABCs data to estimate the 
national disease burden after adjusting for race and age dis-
tribution in the United States.
Medical records review is used to collect demograph-
ics, clinical course, outcome, infection type, underlying 
conditions, and vaccination history for each case-patient. 
For most patients, an isolate from the first positive cul-
ture is collected. Since 1995, with the exception of MRSA 
(for which a convenience sample of 100 isolates has been 
collected since 2005), ≈85% of isolates have been col-
lected from eligible patients. Isolates undergo serologic 
or molecular typing and standardized antimicrobial drug 
susceptibility testing at CDC or other reference laborato-
ries. A collection of ≈80,000 S. pneumoniae, GAS, GBS, 
N. meningitides, and H. influenzae isolates is accessible 
to ABCs partners and external researchers by request 
(http://www.cdc.gov/abcs/pathogens/isolatebank/index.
html). ABCs MRSA isolates are deposited at the Network 
on Antimicrobial Resistance in Staphylococcus aureus, a 
repository sponsored by the National Institute of Allergy 
and Infectious Diseases at the National Institutes of Health 
(http://www.niaid.nih.gov/labsandresources/resources/
dmid/narsa/Pages/default.aspx).
The ABCs infrastructure is also used to conduct sur-
veillance for other bacterial diseases and provides a foun-
dation for epidemiologic investigations. Examples include 
special surveillance for pertussis and legionellosis, case–
control studies to assess vaccine effectiveness, and cohort 
studies to assess the uptake and effectiveness of other pub-
lic health interventions.
ABCs Effects on Vaccine Development,  
Evaluation, and Policy Recommendations
Because of the large, representative catchment area and the 
laboratory-linked, population-based epidemiologic data, 
results from ABCs have been used in the development and 
prelicensure evaluation of multiple vaccines. After licen-
sure, ABCs data have been used to formulate policy rec-
ommendations and to determine the real-world impact of 
vaccines (Table 1).
As mentioned earlier, ABCs closely tracked the de-
cline in IPD in children after the introduction of PCV7 (Fig-
ure 1). Perhaps a more surprising finding, which would not 
have been possible without the large ABCs catchment area 
that includes surveillance among all age groups, was the de-
cline in vaccine-type IPD among adults, particularly those 
>65 years of age (Figure 1). ABCs also identified increased 
incidence of IPD for serotypes not found in PCV7; particu-
larly serotype 19A. These findings contributed to the accel-
erated approval of PCV13, which includes serotype 19A, 
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and the recommendation for its use in children <5 years of 
age. Rates of IPD have further declined since introduction 
of PCV13 (Figure 1).
Age- and serogroup-specific ABCs data highlighted 
the increased risk for vaccine-preventable meningococcal 
disease among college students, adolescents, and young 
adults. These findings contributed to the Advisory Com-
mittee on Immunization Practices policy recommendation 
for routine use of meningococcal conjugate vaccines in all 
persons 11–18 years of age and subsequent recommenda-
tions for a booster dose during late adolescence.
Through long-standing surveillance, ABCs was able 
to document the persistent decline of invasive H. influen-
zae infections among young children after introduction of 
type b vaccine in the mid-1980s (Figure 2). ABCs surveil-
lance for H. influenzae type b (Hib) disease was critical for 
monitoring how vaccine shortages affected disease rates. 
Because of the availability of epidemiologic data linked to 
serotype determination, a shift toward non-Hib disease in 
adults in the post–Hib vaccine era has been recognized.
Although trend data may show indirect evidence of 
a vaccine’s effectiveness, proof of effectiveness requires 
a more formal epidemiologic investigation to account for 
other factors that may influence the decline in disease in-
cidence. The ABCs infrastructure was used to conduct 
case–control studies that confirmed the effectiveness of 
conjugate meningococcal and pneumococcal vaccines 
against invasive disease. These very large studies could 
only have been done through an integrated network, and 
they highlight the efficiencies gained by maintaining such 
an infrastructure.
Serotype and serogroup data from ABCs pathogens are 
also being used to help with formulation of vaccines and 
evaluation of the potential effectiveness of vaccines cur-
rently under development, including those products target-
ing GAS, GBS, S. aureus, and serogroup B meningococcal 
disease. ABCs data have been used to predict the effective-
ness in the United States of a 26-valent GAS vaccine and 
now a 30-valent GAS vaccine that is under development. 
GBS disease burden and serotype data gathered through 
ABCs have been used to inform development of a trivalent 
GBS vaccine now in phase I and II trials. ABCs data have 
been used to determine which population groups would be 
the best candidates for receipt of S. aureus vaccines to pre-
vent invasive MRSA disease and to evaluate the potential 
effect of serogroup B meningococcal vaccines on disease 
burden in the United States.
ABCs Effect on Other Prevention-Related  
Policies and Practices
ABCs and a precursor surveillance system for GBS were 
used to define the need for guidelines for providing antimi-
crobial drugs to pregnant women during delivery to prevent 
early-onset GBS in their newborns; such guidelines were 
published in 1992 (5,6) and 1996 (7). Without evidence as to 
which strategy was better, the 1996 guidelines recommend-
ed that health care providers could use either a screening or 
risk-based approach to decide which women should receive 
prophylaxis during delivery. An ABCs-based cohort study 
that sampled from a population of ≈600,000 live-born infants 
at 8 sites demonstrated the value of screening over the risk-
based approach. Specifically, universal prenatal screening of 
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Table 1. Key	uses	and	findings	of	Active	Bacterial	Core	surveillance	data	for	vaccine	development,	evaluation,	and	policy	formulation* 
Pathogen Vaccines Key	uses	and	findings 
Streptococcus pneumoniae PCV7	and	PCV13 Selection	of	serotypes	included	in	PCV7and	PCV13 
Informed	ACIP	recommendations	for	children	<5	y	of	age 
Tracking	postlicensure	declines	in	cases 
Documented	effectiveness	of	PCV7 
Monitoring	incidence	of	nonvaccine	serotypes 
Accelerated	regulatory	approval	of	PCV13 
Informed	ACIP	recommendations	for	PCV13	use	in	immunocompromised	
adults	and	children 
Neisseria meningitidis Conjugate	vaccines,	
serogroup	B	vaccines 
Informed	ACIP	recommendations	for	children	11–18	y	of	age 
Informed	ACIP	recommendations	for	booster	dose 
Documented	vaccine	effectiveness 
Informed	ACIP	infant	meningococcal	recommendations 
Evaluated	potential	effect	on	serogroup	B	disease	in	United	States 
Haemophilus influenzae Hib	vaccine Tracking	postlicensure	declines	in	Hib	disease	 
Tracking	shift	toward	non-Hib	disease; 
Evaluated	effect	of	vaccine	shortages 
Group	A	Streptococcus M-type	vaccine 
(under	development) 
Estimated	degrees	of	protection	against	severe	group	A	streptococcal	
infections  
Group	B	Streptococcus Trivalent	vaccine 
(under	development) 
Informing	development	of	vaccine	to	prevent	early-onset	(within	1	week	of	
life)	group	B	streptococcal	disease	 
Methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus 
S. aureus vaccine 
(under	development) 
Determining	population	groups	to	target	 
*ACIP,	Advisory	Committee	on	Immunization	Practices;	Hib,	H. influenzae type	b	vaccine;	PCV7,	7-valent	pneumococcal	conjugate	vaccine;	PCV13,	13-
valent	pneumococcal	conjugate	vaccine.	An	expanded	version	of	this	table	with	references	is	available	in	the	online	Technical Appendix	
(http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/article/21/9/14-1333-Techapp1.pdf). 
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pregnant women for vaginal/rectal colonization with GBS 
and providing antimicrobial drugs during delivery to those 
who were colonized was ≈50% more effective at prevent-
ing early onset GBS than providing prophylaxis to pregnant 
women on the basis of certain risk factors (8). This finding 
led to issuance of new guidelines in 2002 (9) and revised 
guidelines in 2010 (10), which resulted in further reductions 
in disease. Since the early 1990s, ABCs has documented a 
>80% decline in the incidence of early-onset GBS infection 
and prevention of an estimated 70,000 cases of early-onset 
GBS infection (Figure 3).
Guidelines for the prevention of invasive GAS infec-
tions were also informed by ABCs surveillance and special 
studies. An ABCs study found an increased risk for severe 
GAS infection among household contacts of index patients 
(11). These data, coupled with data that were collected from 
routine surveillance on the frequency of GAS infection 
in postpartum women (12) and postsurgical patients pro-
vided the foundation for the development of CDC policy 
guidance in households and health care settings (13). ABCs 
surveillance data on the risk for GAS infections among 
long-term care facility patients also helped inform preven-
tion and control strategies for those settings (14,15).
Monitoring of Antimicrobial Drug Resistance
The first nationwide estimates of the burden of invasive 
MRSA were derived from ABCs; in 2005, ≈94,000 cases 
and ≈18,000 deaths were attributed to invasive MRSA 
(16). Most (≈84%) infections were health care–associ-
ated—either hospital-onset (culture obtained >3 days af-
ter admission) or health care–associated community-onset 
(culture obtained from outpatient or within 3 calendar days 
after admission from a patient with a health care–associ-
ated risk factor, which include presence of a central venous 
catheter within 2 days before MRSA culture or history of 
surgery, hospitalization, dialysis, or residence of long-
term care facility in the 12 months preceding culture date). 
The prominence of health care–associated community-onset 
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Figure 1.	Incidence	of	invasive	
pneumococcal	disease	in	children	
<5	and	adults	>65	years	of	age,	
Active	Bacterial	Core	surveillance,	
United	States,	1998–2012.	PCV7,	
7-valent	pneumococcal	conjugate	
vaccine;	PCV13,	13-valent	
pneumococcal	conjugate	vaccine.
Figure 2. Incidence	of	invasive	Haemophilus influenzae disease,	by	age	group,	United	States,	1989–2012.
infections was newly brought to light by the ABCs network 
(16). This report led to increased awareness of MRSA in-
fections, and prevention of health care–associated MRSA 
became a goal for public health agencies and policy mak-
ers (17–19). ABCs documented a 54% decline in hospital-
onset MRSA and a 28% decline in health care–associated 
community-onset MRSA invasive infections during 2005–
2011 (Figure 4) (20). An ABCs-based study evaluating risk 
factors for health care–associated community-onset MRSA 
infections has just been completed. Despite great progress 
in reducing health care–associated MRSA infections, rates 
of invasive MRSA infections in the community among per-
sons without recent health care exposures (community-asso-
ciated infections) remain largely unchanged, indicating the 
ongoing need for prevention strategies outside hospital set-
tings (Figure 4) (20).
ABCs data showed that, from 1995 through 1998, a 
large and increasing proportion (up to 25%) of isolates 
from patients with IPD were resistant to penicillin (21). Af-
ter introduction of PCV7, analysis of ≈43,000 isolates col-
lected from all ABCs sites found a 64% decline in penicil-
lin-nonsusceptible IPD among children <5 years of age and 
a 45% decline among adults >65 years from 1998–1999 
through 2008. This finding demonstrated the effectiveness 
of routine use of pneumococcal conjugate vaccine in chil-
dren for reducing the spread of resistant strains on a na-
tional scale in all age groups (22). However, 30% of ABCs 
isolates from patients with IPD remain resistant to >1 anti-
microbial drug (http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/threat-
report-2013/).
In contrast to IPD, GAS infections remain sensitive to 
penicillin. GAS isolates are collected to monitor the resis-
tance of invasive GAS infections to not only β-lactams but 
also macrolides and other antimicrobial drugs. ABCs data 
have documented increasing resistance to erythromycin 
(currently 8%–11%), a macrolide commonly used for treat-
ing pharyngitis in children who are allergic to penicillin 
(http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/threat-report-2013/).
Monitoring antimicrobial drug resistance of GBS 
across a large geographic area is critical because antimicro-
bial prophylaxis is widely used to prevent early-onset GBS. 
GBS isolates from ABCs have remained largely susceptible 
to first-line prophylaxis and treatment with β-lactams, but 
for some isolates, β-lactam MICs have been increasing (23). 
Increasing resistance of GBS isolates to clindamycin discov-
ered through ABCs prompted a 2002 change in the second-
line prophylaxis recommendation for intrapartum women, 
from clindamycin to cefazolin for penicillin-allergic women 
at low risk for anaphylaxis (9). Two reports of vancomy-
cin-resistant GBS isolates (1 inside and 1 outside the ABCs 
catchment area) have recently been published (24). Al-
though apparently not widespread, vancomycin resistance is 
a concerning development that must be closely monitored 
because it is an alternative agent for prophylaxis in penicil-
lin-allergic patients at high risk for anaphylaxis (10).
During 2007–2008, ciprofloxacin-resistant N. men-
ingitidis was identified in 3 patients: 2 from Minnesota 
(within the ABCs catchment area) and 1 from a bordering 
area of North Dakota (not an ABCs site) (25). Although 
N. meningitidis isolates had routinely been collected for 
serogrouping, resistance testing was not routinely done be-
cause previous evaluations had shown low levels of anti-
microbial drug resistance (26). When the potential problem 
arose with ciprofloxacin, a commonly used agent for pro-
phylaxis of close contacts, the existing ABCs infrastructure 
was used to test N. meningitidis isolates for antimicrobial 
drug resistance. No additional ABCs isolates collected dur-
ing 2007–2011 were found to be resistant to ciprofloxacin, 
providing reassurance that the chemoprophylaxis policy 
recommendations continued to be sound (27).
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Figure 3. Incidence	of	early-onset	group	B	Streptococcus disease	
before	and	after	issuance	of	guidelines,	United	States,	1990–
2010.	AAP,	American	Academy	of	Pediatrics;	ACOG,	American	
Congress	of	Obstetricians	and	Gynecologists.
Figure 4.	Incidence	of	invasive	methicillin-resistant	
Staphylococcus aureus	(MRSA)	(defined	as	MRSA	isolated	from	
a	normally	sterile	source)	infections,	by	epidemiologic	category,	
Active	Bacterial	Core	surveillance,	United	States,	2005–2011	(20).	
Twenty	Years	of	Active	Bacterial	Core	Surveillance
Response to Public Health Emergencies and 
Surveillance for Other Emerging Infections
One of the key attributes of ABCs and other EIP activities is 
flexibility for responding to public health emergencies. After 
the 2001 anthrax attack, the ABCs infrastructure was used 
to establish and test a more sensitive and timely system for 
identifying inhalation anthrax in Connecticut (28). After the 
discovery of severe acute respiratory syndrome in 2002, the 
EIP infrastructure assisted with surveillance activities and 
the investigation of suspected cases (29). During the 2009 in-
fluenza A(H1N1) pandemic, early recognition of IPD among 
pandemic influenza patients at the Colorado ABCs site led 
to increased emphasis on pneumococcal disease prevention 
strategies (30). The Tennessee ABCs site helped the Tennes-
see Department of Health investigate the recent outbreak of 
fungal meningitis (31).
ABCs has also been used as a surveillance platform 
for other emerging infections, including pertussis and le-
gionellosis. Since the 1980s, the number of reported pertus-
sis cases has been gradually increasing: the 48,277 cases 
reported in 2012 represent the largest number of cases since 
1955 (Figure 5) (http://www.cdc.gov/pertussis/downloads/
pertuss-surv-report-2012.pdf). From 2000 through 2009, 
the age-adjusted incidence of legionellosis has almost 
tripled, from 0.40 to 1.08 cases per 100,000 persons (4). 
Since 2011, enhanced pertussis surveillance has been con-
ducted at 6 sites and legionellosis surveillance at 10 sites. 
In addition to enhanced surveillance, a study to estimate the 
effectiveness of maternal vaccination at preventing infant 
pertussis is under way.
ABCs Effect on Domestic and International  
Surveillance Programs
A goal of ABCs is to share its methods and experiences 
with domestic and international partners. In addition to pro-
viding materials, methods, and results through its website 
(http://www.cdc.gov/abcs/index.html), outreach to partners 
has been provided at multiple national and international 
conferences. ABCs closely collaborated with the South 
Africa National Institute for Communicable Diseases in the 
establishment of a similar surveillance system in that country 
and in sharing lessons learned and epidemiologic findings 
(http://www.nicd.ac.za/?page=homepage&id=125). ABCs 
has also been used as the standard for evaluating and vali-
dating less expensive methods for tracking antimicrobial 
drug susceptibility and measuring vaccine effectiveness—
methods that can be used in settings with fewer resources 
(32,33).
Challenges and Opportunities
When ABCs began, most cases were identified by review-
ing paper laboratory log sheets and computer printouts and 
most case report forms were abstracted from paper records. 
The increasing availability of electronic laboratory and 
medical records may improve timeliness, completeness, 
and accuracy of reporting (34). Ensuring that cases are ap-
propriately captured requires an understanding of labora-
tory information system codes and periodic reviews of how 
data are imported. Extracting information and transferring 
it into usable formats remains a challenge (35).
With the exception of surveillance for pertussis and 
legionellosis, the current ABCs case definition includes 
only culture-proven disease. Although culture remains the 
standard for diagnosing invasive infections, the use of cul-
ture-independent diagnostic tests will probably increase. 
Validation of culture-independent diagnostics will remain 
a major consideration for determining whether culture-in-
dependent tests are added to the ABCs case definition.
The growing fields of microbial and human genom-
ics provide ABCs with a potential new role in increasing 
the understanding of disease transmission and pathogen-
esis. ABCs is uniquely poised to evaluate the relationship 
between human and pathogen genetic variation and infec-
tious disease, given that surveillance is population based 
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Figure 5.	Number	of	pertussis	cases	
reported	to	the	National	Notifiable	
Diseases	Surveillance	System,	
1922–2014.	Inset	shows	detail	view	
of	data	for	1990–2014.	Sources:	
Centers	for	Disease	Control	and	
Prevention;	National	Notifiable	
Diseases	Surveillance	System	and	
Supplemental	Pertussis	Surveillance	
System,	1922–1949;	passive	reports	
to	the	Public	Health	Service.	Data	for	
2014	are	provisional.	DTP,	diphtheria,	
tetanus,	pertussis	vaccine;	DTap,	
diphtheria,	tetanus,	acellular	pertussis	
vaccine	given	to	children	up	to	7	years	
of	age;	Tdap,	tetanus,	diphtheria,	
acellular	pertussis	vaccine	given	to	
adolescents	and	adults.	
and that bacterial isolates are collected. A study currently 
under way is using whole-genome sequencing to compare 
isolates from patients with GAS and necrotizing fasciitis 
or streptococcal toxic shock syndrome with isolates from 
persons with isolated bacteremia; another study is planned 
to examine potential differences in host genomic factors. 
ABCs is also validating the use of whole-genome sequenc-
ing for outbreaks caused by N. meningitidis.
In the United States, the leading cause of illness and 
death is chronic disease. A better understanding of the 
associations and interactions between chronic diseases 
and invasive bacterial infections is needed for a better 
understanding of the pathophysiology, potential inter-
ventions, and prognoses for invasive bacterial infections. 
ABCs surveillance data coupled with other data sources 
have been used to analyze the influence of chronic dis-
eases on IPD (36) and H. influenzae infection in adults 
(37). Efforts to analyze the effects of obesity and diabe-
tes on the incidence and severity of ABCs pathogens are 
under way.
A major goal of ABCs is assessment of public health 
disparities and promotion of health equity across popula-
tion groups. ABCs has documented differences in rates of 
disease across persons of different races; invasive GBS 
(http://www.cdc.gov/abcs/reports-findings/survreports/
gbs12.pdf), pneumococcal (38), and MRSA (http://www.
cdc.gov/abcs/reports-findings/survreports/mrsa12.pdf) 
infections are more common among black than white per-
sons. However, racial differences are just one measure 
of disparity, and categorizing a person’s race is becom-
ing increasingly difficult as the United States becomes 
more multiracial. ABCs analyses have incorporated cen-
sus tract data to determine the association between area-
level poverty and disease incidence (39,40). In 2013, 
ABCs started incorporating census tract information into 
routine surveillance.
Conclusions
ABCs is distinctive among public health surveillance sys-
tems in that it is designed to capture nearly all cases of 
culture-confirmed invasive bacterial diseases over a large, 
well-defined, and geographically diverse area of the Unit-
ed States. These comprehensive data enable accurate esti-
mations of the national disease burden for severe bacterial 
infections under surveillance. The collection of isolates 
in conjunction with epidemiologic data has contributed 
to the microbiological and molecular characterization of 
pathogens, which has played a part in the development 
of vaccines and monitoring of antimicrobial drug resis-
tance. Although the surveillance system alone provides 
powerful data for informing public health actions, the 
large ABCs infrastructure provides an efficient and effec-
tive platform for engaging in special investigations that 
would otherwise require additional resources. The infra-
structure also provides the flexibility needed to respond 
to emergencies and to serve as a surveillance platform for 
other emerging pathogens. Perhaps the greatest strength 
of ABCs and the reason for its success have been the com-
mitted, genial, and long-lasting collaboration among lo-
cal, state, and federal agencies, academic institutions, and 
clinical laboratories.
Although ABCs has addressed many questions of 
public health significance that have directly affected 
public health policy and practice, many questions still 
remain (Table 2). To maintain the ability of ABCs to 
answer questions of high importance, the network must 
continue to embrace and adapt to the changing public 
health, laboratory, information technology and medical 
landscapes.
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Table 2. Questions	left	unanswered	with	regard	to	Active	Bacterial	Core	surveillance* 
Organism	or	disease	 Questions 
Streptococcus pneumoniae Should	PCV13	be	recommended	for	adults? 
What	proportion	of	invasive	pneumococcal	disease	is	preventable	with	vaccine? 
What	other	strategies	are	available	to	prevent	non–vaccine	type	disease? 
Neisseria meningitidis Should	serogroup B	vaccines	be	recommended	for	routine	use	in	the	United	States? 
Haemophilus influenzae Are	control	strategies	(e.g.,	chemoprophylaxis,	vaccines)	needed	for	non-Hib	disease? 
Group	B	Streptococcus Will	antimicrobial	drug	resistance	reduce	the	effectiveness	of	intrapartum	prophylaxis? 
What	will	be	the	projected	effect	of	vaccines	on	infant	disease? 
Are	there	interventions	to	reduce	infant	late-onset	disease? 
Group	A	Streptococcus What	age	groups	should	be	targeted	for	vaccines	according	to	potential	effect	on	invasive	disease? 
MRSA Can	modifiable	risk	factors	for	HACO	MRSA	be	identified? 
What	are	effective	strategies	for	preventing	infections	outside	acute-care	settings? 
Pertussis Does	the	acellular vaccine	given	during	pregnancy	effectively	prevent	pertussis	in	infants? 
What	is	the	effect	of	newly	emerging	Bordatella pertussis strain	changes	on	disease	epidemiology,	
clinical	presentation,	and	vaccine	effectiveness? 
Legionellosis Why	are	rates	higher	among	black	than	white	persons	and	higher	among	men	than	women? 
Why	do	rates	differ	by	geographic	area? 
*PCV13, 13-valent	pneumococcal	conjugate	vaccine;	Hib,	H. influenzae type	b;	HACO,	health	care–associated	community	onset;	MRSA,	methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus. 
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